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A B S T R AC T. Although it is fitting to celebrate Gideon's promise of representation for indigent
criminal defendants at this landmark anniversary, it is important also to note that part of
Gideon's legacy should be our recognition of the limits of law in the fulfillment of that promise.
Law's most powerful role in the struggle to ensure adequate representation for the poor in
criminal cases will be in its capacity to generate and direct the political will to produce
institutional change. The critical question to ask is how law can help to move the political actors
who control the power of the purse, the organization and administration of indigent defense
services, and the shape of the substantive criminal law to allocate the resources and make the
institutional changes that are necessary to fix what in many jurisdictions is a failing system of
indigent defense. Although there is no silver bullet, there are a variety of complementary
strategies that can and should be pursued. These strategies include working for legislative
change to limit the scope of the substantive criminal law, promoting the success of structural
reform litigation in both federal and state courts, enlisting the support of state bar overseers and
associations as well as the ABA, enlisting the private defense bar and NGOs that specialize in
criminal defense to set higher norms of practice, urging greater federal government involvement
in promoting indigent defense reform in the states, promoting social entrepreneurship to
generate creative solutions to the indigent defense crisis, and harnessing both the great power of
the media to educate and motivate the public and the more targeted power of the legal academy
to educate and motivate the next generation of lawyers to address this pressing problem.
AUTHOR. Henry J. Friendly Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I thank Tucker
Carrington and Jonathan Rapping for helpful conversations and Andrew Chan, Daniel Kanter,
and Conor Mulroe for helpful research assistance.
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Levon Brooks was exonerated by the Innocence Project after being
convicted of the 1990 rape and murder of a child on the basis of bogus expert
"bite mark" evidence. At Brooks's trial in Noxubee County, Mississippi, the
prosecutor-the allegorically named Forrest Allgood-gave a short but
tremendously powerful opening statement. Allgood began by describing how
three-year-old Courtney Smith had been put into bed along with her two
sisters at their grandmother's house. He continued:
And some time that night, ladies and gentlemen, while they slept, a
silent evil cloaked in the shape of a man came into the house. But the
man who did this, ladies and gentlemen, left his mark. The State of
Mississippi is simply going to prove to you that that man, and the man
who left those teeth marks, is Levon Brooks.'
What happened next, however, was even more powerful than this hard-
hitting opening. What happened next was - nothing. That's right - nothing.
Levon Brooks's defense attorneys in this capital trial did not stand. They did
not say anything at all.
The moment no doubt passed quickly; defense counsel's decision not to
respond takes up just over a line of the trial transcript. But the effect
was devastating. The message to the jury could not have been more
clear: Brooks' lawyers said nothing because they had nothing to say. It
was the functional equivalent of endorsing Allgood's opening
statement. If a criminal trial is an exercise in granting a defendant his
day in court, Levon Brooks had just watched his come and go in a
matter of seconds.'
Eventually, Brooks's lawyers gave a brief and faltering opening statement after
the close of the entire prosecution case and put on a half-hearted defense case.
Their failure to meaningfully contest their innocent client's guilt of a heinous
crime cost him sixteen years in prison before he was exonerated.
Most crimes are not as awful as the rape and murder of a young child. And
of course, most criminal defendants are not completely innocent like Brooks.
But dismal failures of representation like that of Brooks's lawyers are all too
common. There is the Washington state lawyer who failed to inform his
1. Transcript of Trial at 461-62, State v. Brooks (Miss. Cir. Ct. 1992) (No. 5937) (emphasis
added), quoted in Tucker Carrington, Mississippi Innocence: The Convictions and
Exonerations of Levon Brooks and Kennedy Brewer and the Failure of the American
Promise 73-74 (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
2. Carrington, supra note 1, at 74.
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twelve-year-old client or his client's parents that a plea of guilty to child
molestation could never be expunged from his record and would lead to his
registration as a sex offender, possibly for the rest of his life.3 And there are the
New Orleans public defenders who were unable, in the wake of Hurricane
Katrina, to produce a list of the 6,oo to 8,ooo prisoners whom they were
supposed to be representing.' And let us not forget the Texas lawyers who
slept through portions of their clients' capital trials-who, Stephen Bright
quips, give a new meaning to the phrase "Dream Team."s
The recitation of dramatic failures like these, however, can mislead us
about the nature of the challenge of ensuring adequate indigent defense
services. The failures of individual lawyers, however appalling, are often the
product of structural forces that pose systemic barriers to the delivery of
adequate criminal defense services to the poor, even by demonstrably capable
and dedicated lawyers. Structural constraints prevent many well-intentioned
lawyers from meeting regularly with their clients, conducting adequate
investigations or legal research, trying (as opposed to pleading) plausible cases,
and providing meaningful adversarial testing of the evidence on the rare
occasions when they do go to trial. For example, in some Mississippi counties,
defendants may wait up to a year to speak to a court-appointed lawyer about
their case, and many lawyers meet their clients for the first time on the day of
trial. 6 In Miami-Dade County, Florida, the average felony caseload per lawyer
has reached five hundred in recent years due to budget cuts.7 And these
conditions are not confined to the South: in New York, indigent defense
services are supplied through a patchwork of inadequately funded county-
based systems, without any statewide attorney training, supervision, or
monitoring.
3. KAREN HOUPPERT, CHASING GIDEON: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR POOR PEOPLE'S JUSTICE 17-
20, 46 (2013).
4. Id. at 124-25.
5. Henry Weinstein, A Sleeping Lawyer and a Ticket to Death Row, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 2000,
http://articles.latimes.com/2000/juVlS/news/mn-53250.
6. See Assembly Line Justice: Mississippi's Indigent Defense Crisis, NAACP LEGAL DEF. &
EDUC. FUND, INC. 6 (Feb. 2003), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dan/aba/migrated
Aegalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/ms-assemblylinejustice.authcheckdam.pdf.
7. See Deborah Hastings, Associated Press, Nationwide, Public Defender Offices Are in Crisis,
SEATTLE TIMES, June 3, 2009, http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2oo9296604
_apusnodefenseabridged.html.
8. See Comm'n on the Future of Indigent Def. Servs., Final Report to the ChiefJudge of the State
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It is not only indigent defense lawyers (or former public defenders like
myself) who note these endemic deficiencies. Just last year, the nation's chief
prosecutor, Attorney General Eric Holder, acknowledged grimly that "[a]cross
the country, public defender offices and other indigent defense providers are
underfunded and understaffed."9 As a result, Holder concluded, "[t]oo often,
when legal representation is available to the poor, it's rendered less effective by
insufficient resources, overwhelming caseloads, and inadequate oversight.
[T]he basic rights guaranteed under Gideon have yet to be fully realized."o
The widespread recognition of this depressing reality is reflected in the
titles of the scholarly articles that I collected to prepare for this occasion, all of
which range from concerned to excoriating about the state of indigent criminal
defense services. Riffing off of the title of Anthony Lewis' triumphant account
of the Gideon litigation in his blockbuster Gideon's Trumpet (also a major
motion picture starring Henry Fonda), scholars have declared Gideon's trumpet
to be "muted,"" "silen[t],"" or out of "tune"" and have worried about the
promise of Gideon being "blown away."" If Clarence Earl Gideon had had a
name of different biblical provenance, I'm sure we would be reading about
Noah's leaky ark, Moses' hollow staff, or David's broken slingshot.
These uniformly bleak assessments of the health of Gideon's mandate leave
me of two minds. On the one hand, I share the completely justified indignation
of the many lawyers and scholars familiar with the current state of indigent
defense and agree that this half-century anniversary should be commemorated
with nothing less than a call to arms to address the profound shortfalls of
representation in our criminal justice system. On the other hand, I recall with
great pride my days as a line attorney with the Public Defender Service for the
District of Columbia (PDS) and believe that organizations like PDS and the
inspired work of some of its alumni -like Stephen Bright, Mary Kennedy, and
Jonathan Rapping-can offer some help in forging the difficult path forward.
9. Eric Holder, Att'y Gen., Address at the American Bar Association National Summit on
Indigent Defense (Feb. 4, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag
/speeches/2o12/ag-speech-12o2o4.htnl).
1o. Id.
ii. Victoria Nourse, Gideon's Muted Trumpet, 58 MD. L. REV. 1417 (1999).
1. Jordan Glaser, Note, The Silence of Gideon's Trumpet: The Court's Inattention to Systemic
Inequities Causing Violations of Speedy Trial Rights in Vermont v. Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 1283
(2oo9), 89 NEB. L. REV. 396 (2010).
13. Kim Taylor-Thompson, Tuning Up Gideon's Trumpet, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1461 (2003).
14. Stephen B. Bright, Stephen 0. Kinnard & David A. Webster, Keeping Gideon from Being
Blown Away: Prospective Challenges to Inadequate Representation May Be Our Best Hope, CRiM.
JUST., Winter 1990, at lo.
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The constitutional right to counsel itself shares something of a similar
oppositional duality. On the one hand, the right to counsel is uniquely
powerful, because counsel is the conduit for the assertion of all other rights,
whether constitutional or nonconstitutional. On the other hand, the right to
counsel is also exceedingly oblique: the right itself does not specify, and courts
have had great difficulty elaborating, just what it is that renders a legal
representative the "counsel" that the constitution requires, beyond a bar card
and a pulse.
The landmark Gideon decision, too, shares this duality. On the one hand,
the case is one of the most famous of the Warren Court's criminal procedure
revolution, and it has been recognized by the Supreme Court itself in its
retroactivity jurisprudence as the epitome of a "watershed" decision of
constitutional criminal procedure." On the other hand, as Justice Harlan wrote
separately to emphasize, Gideon merely formalized what had been almost
entirely accomplished by the preexisting "special circumstances" rule, because
the Court had already "come to recognize . . . that the mere existence of a
serious criminal charge constituted in itself special circumstances requiring the
services of counsel at trial."' 6 Thus, one could fairly characterize Gideon as less
than revolutionary -as merely the formal interment of an already moribund
rule so as to pull in a relatively few recalcitrant outliers. Moreover, while Gideon
promised the appointment of counsel for the indigent in ringing terms, it
remained crucially silent on the quality and scope of services that
constitutionally sufficient counsel must provide or on the appropriate
mechanisms for the funding, appointment, training, or supervision of such
counsel, thus leaving the right very far from self-executing.
Fast forward to the present, where there has been much excitement, at least
in academic circles, about the Supreme Court's recent expansions of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in cases like Padilla," Lafler,'8 and Frye,'9 among
others. Commentators have hailed "a new era""o and dubbed last Term the
Supreme Court's "right-to-counsel Term,"' while embracing what they see as
15. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989).
16. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 351 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring).
17. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
18. Lafler v. Cooper, 13 2 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
ig. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
20, Justin F. Marceau, Embracing a New Era ofIneffective Assistance of Counsel, 14 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 1161 (2012).
21. Christopher Durocher, Are We Closer to Fulfilling Gideon's Promise? The Effects of the
Supreme Court's "Right-to-Counsel Term," AM. CONST. Soc'Y FOR L. & POL'Y (Jan. 2013),
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powerful "unintended consequences"" of the Court's recent decisions. Despite
this enthusiasm, the Court's recent Sixth Amendment decisions share many of
the same tensions as Gideon itself. On the one hand, like Gideon, the recent
decisions represented welcome constitutional recognition of new realities.
Padilla recognized that "changes to our immigration law have dramatically
raised the stakes of a noncitizen's criminal conviction"" and thus held that a
defense lawyer fell below the constitutional threshold of effective advocacy in
failing to advise a client of the possible deportation consequences of his
conviction. Lafler and Frye recognized the "simple reality" that "plea bargains
have become so central to the administration of the criminal justice system that
defense counsel have responsibilities in the plea bargain process."' These are
important, even "landmark" holdings, and commentators are not wrong to
hope and predict that these decisions will open up new doctrinal avenues in
Sixth Amendment litigation.
But Gideon has demonstrated that even "landmark" or "watershed"
doctrinal change cannot, by itself, be the catalyst for the kind of institutional
change necessary to create and maintain an adequate system for the provision
of indigent defense services across the country. Courts are the enforcers of
constitutional remedies, but in the Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel context,
their primary enforcement role has involved their power to reverse individual
convictions on direct appeal or postconviction review. The success of this mode
of enforcement is, of course, limited by the constitutional standards
themselves, and the application of the Strickland standard for assessing
ineffective assistance of counsel, especially during postconviction review when
most claims must be developed, is truly daunting.2 s However, regardless of
constitutional standards, case-by-case review is also limited by the fact that the
primary means of policing failures of representation in the courts are the very
representatives whose failures need policing-and that is on a good day. On
bad days, which are more common, indigent criminal defendants must police
http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Durocher- AreWeCloser-toFulfillingGideons
Promise.pdf.
22. Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Unintended Consequences: The Impact of the Court's Recent Cases on
Structural Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 25 FED. SENT'G REP. 1o6 (2012).
23. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473,1480 (2010).
24. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (quoting Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012), for the
proposition that ours "is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials").
25. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See generally Stephen F. Smith, Taking
Strickland Claims Seriously, 93 MARQ. L. REv. 515, 518-26 (2009) (describing the extent to
which deficient representation is tolerated, at least in noncapital cases, under the Strickland
standard).
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the failures of their appointed representatives without any counsel at all,
because indigent criminal defendants are not generally entitled to appointed
counsel on postconviction review except in capital cases. So generating a better
list of constitutional duties and remedies is not even half the battle, without
more reliable means of enforcement.
My own journey from the trenches of direct client representation at trial
and constitutional litigation on appeal to the different roles of scholar and
governing-board member of a statewide public defender system has impressed
upon me the limits of Supreme Court doctrine. Moving from courtroom to
classroom to boardroom has made clear to me that any thoroughgoing solution
to our Sixth Amendment quandary is less a matter of law than one of political
will. Law's most powerful role in the struggle to ensure adequate
representation to the poor in criminal cases will be in its capacity to generate
and direct the political will to produce institutional change. The largest and
most obvious piece of the puzzle is, of course, the power of the purse.
Especially in the financially straitened years since the economic crisis of 2008,
resources for indigent defense have been hit hard, suffering reductions from
what were already woefully inadequate levels in many jurisdictions. Although
the need for greater resources for indigent defense services may be obvious, it is
here that political will falters most, for equally obvious reasons. With
clamoring demand for dwindling public funds for schools, hospitals, roads and
bridges, public transportation, firefighters, and police officers, it is not
surprising that more money for lawyers representing alleged criminals is not
high on anyone's list. Generating the will to provide these crucial resources is
an enormous challenge.
Even adequate resources-which remain something of a pipedream-
would not be sufficient to solve some of the structural problems that undergird
the country's indigent defense crisis. The lack of adequate organization,
training, and oversight of indigent defense lawyers by experienced leaders; the
lack of crucial independence from the political and judicial branches that many
such lawyers and public defense organizations face; and the absence of a robust
culture of client-centered, zealous advocacy all prevent the delivery of decent
indigent defense services just as surely as the lack of adequate material
resources. Moreover, precisely because infusions of funding sufficient to solve
the nation's indigent defense crisis are almost certainly not going to be
forthcoming any time soon, it is crucial to consider alternative means to
approach the problem. These means include structural improvements that
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would not necessarily require large financial infusions, as well as possible
changes in the substantive criminal law. Some jurisdictions have experimented
with reclassifying low-level, nonviolent offenses as civil infractions rather than
crimes, and others have increased opportunities for pretrial diversion, with
great success at reducing defender caseloads while also conserving scarce
judicial and prosecutorial resources."
Thus, in my view, the crucial question to ask in this anniversary year is how
to move the political actors who control the power of the purse, the
organization and administration of indigent defense services, and the shape of
the substantive criminal law to allocate the resources and make the institutional
changes that are necessary to fix what in many jurisdictions is a failing system
of indigent defense, an embarrassment to the ideal of justice that we teach in
law schools and celebrate at bar swearing-in and naturalization ceremonies
around the country. There is clearly no silver bullet here; rather, the answer to
this question involves the long, slow, and concerted effort of all possible
institutional actors. This may not be the sort of sexy or exciting answer that
makes a great banner logo or after-dinner speech, but it has the virtue of
truth -and, truth be told, a measure of hope.
Although, as I indicated above, case-by-case review of attorney
performance under Strickland offers little likelihood of promoting institutional
change, structural litigation under the Sixth Amendment aimed at declaratory
or injunctive relief for systemic problems like inadequate funding and
unmanageable caseloads shows significantly more promise. The Supreme
Court shut off systemic arguments by individual defendants seeking to
overturn their convictions in United States v. Cronic,2s the companion case to
Strickland, which held that except in the most extraordinary of circumstances,
proof of ineffective assistance of counsel requires evidence of specific acts or
omissions that demonstrate deficient performance, rather than evidence of
background circumstances (like time constraints or counsel's inexperience) that
would likely impede performance." However, structural litigation seeking
prospective or injunctive relief is not necessarily limited in the same way,
though it has run into its own difficulties.
In the first wave of structural litigation in the decades following Strickland,
victories were few and evanescent. For example, in a major federal action
27. See Joel M. Schumm, Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, National
Indigent Defense Reform: The Solution Is Multifaceted, A.B.A. 14-17 (2012), http://www
.abanow.org/wordpress/wp-content/files-flutter/1357574231NIDRSolution.pdf.
28. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
29. Id. at 663-67.
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seeking a remedy for Georgia's now-defunct, county-based system of indigent
defense, the ACLU won an important victory when the Eleventh Circuit
recognized that the Strickland-Cronic standard for reversal of individual
convictions "is inappropriate for a civil suit seeking prospective relief' because
the Sixth Amendment protects rights beyond those that can be shown to affect
the outcome of a particular trial, and concluded that the appropriate standard is
one that looks to "the likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable
injury, and the inadequacy of remedies at law.""o However, the Eleventh
Circuit eventually ruled against the plaintiffs" on the grounds of Younger
abstention," which prevents federal courts from issuing rulings that would
interfere with ongoing state criminal prosecutions - a doctrine that has thus far
precluded the success of Sixth Amendment structural litigation in the federal
courts.
State court structural litigation is not hampered by abstention doctrine, but
many state courts have rejected such litigation to reform indigent defense
services by insisting, contra the Eleventh Circuit, that the Strickland-Cronic
standard requires proof of specific prejudice from systemic underfunding and
excessive caseloads,' or by holding that resource constraints must be
addressed by the legislature rather than the courts.3s Moreover, in the few early
cases that did succeed in state courts, in which state supreme courts announced
rebuttable inferences of ineffective assistance of counsel, 6 or set guidelines for
the compensation of indigent defense counsel," the success achieved was
3o. Luckey v. Harris, 86o F.2d 1012, 1017 (1ith Cir. 1988) (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.
488, 502 (1974)).
31. See Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673 (1ith Cir. 1992) (declining to exercise its equitable
jurisdiction to hear the case).
32. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
33. See Eve Brensike Primus, Litigation Strategies for Dealing with the Indigent Defense Crisis, AM.
CONsT. Soc'Y FOR L. & POL'y 4-5 (Sept. 2010), http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files
/Primus-_Litigation Strategies.pdf.
34. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Minn. 1996) (rejecting such a claim as "too
speculative and hypothetical").
35. See, e.g., Webb v. Commonwealth, 528 S.E.2d 138, 145 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that, as
to the challenge to statutory fee caps for court-appointed counsel, "redress must come from
the General Assembly").
36. State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. 1984); State v. Peart, 621 So.2d 780 (La. 1993).
37. State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1n50 (Okla. 1990).
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fleeting in that the courts failed to continue to invoke the inference of
ineffectiveness or to sustain necessary increases in indigent defense funding.2
These early defeats and evanescent victories did not stem the tide of
structural litigation to address the continuing indigent defense crisis, and more
recent cases have produced more change and suggest a path forward. In my
home state of Massachusetts, two different lawsuits, spanning 2004 and 2005,
sought to address a shortage of indigent defense lawyers due to the low rate of
attorney compensation. 9 At one point, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court ordered that indigent defendants detained pretrial must be released if no
attorneys could be appointed for them in a specified time period. Although
then-Governor Mitt Romney sought to play a game of chicken with the Court
by publicly declaring that the judiciary was putting the public's safety at risk,4 o
the threat of judicial action ultimately led the Massachusetts legislature to
unanimously pass bills providing for substantially increased funding for
counsel and other requested reforms."1 Earlier litigation in Florida had likewise
produced a threat from the Florida Supreme Court to order the "immediate
release pending appeal of indigent convicted felons,"4  which played a
significant role in prompting legislative action to increase funding for the state
public defender. 3 Structural litigation has produced a number of settlements
and consent decrees to address funding and caseload crises in states including
Georgia, Washington, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut.'
38. See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases: A National
Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. io31, 1117-21 (20o6); Note, Effectively Inefective: The Failure ofCourts
To Address Underfunded Indigent Defense Systems, 118 HAIlv. L. REV. 1731, 1735-41 (2005).
39. See Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895 (Mass. 2004);
Stephen F. Hanlon, State Constitutional Challenges to Indigent Defense Systems, 75 Mo. L. REV.
751, 760 n.56 (2010) (citing Arianna S. ex rel. Weber v. Massachusetts, No. SJ2004-0282
(Mass. filed June 28, 2004)).
40. Michael Levenson, Officials Told To Testify in Public Defender Dispute, Bos. GLOBE, Aug.
19, 2004, http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2004/o8/19/officials
_told-to testify-in public defender-dispute.
41. See Jonathan Saltzman, Pay-Raise Measure for Court-Appointed Attorneys Becomes Law, Bos.
GLOBE, July 30, 2005, http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2oo5/07
/30/pay-raise measure for court appointed attorneysbecomeslaw.
42. In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial Circuit Pub. Defender,
561 So. 2d 1130, 1139 (Fla. 1990).
43. See Hanlon, supra note 39, at 757 (2010).
44. See Vidhya K. Reddy, Indigent Defense Reform: The Role of Systemic Litigation in
Operationalizing the Gideon Right to Counsel 19 (Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper
No. 1279185, 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1279185.
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Even in the absence of a formal settlement or consent decree, litigation can
play an important role in generating legislative action, as it did in Montana in
prompting the creation of a statewide public defender in 2005.4s Conversely,
legislation can help promote successful litigation: in Missouri, the passage of a
statute to address an indigent defense caseload crisis was vetoed by the
Governor, but the state's Public Defender Commission convinced the state
Supreme Court to use its judicial power to mandate the remedies that the failed
statute would have provided.46
Commentators have attempted to generalize from this growing list of
successes about the features that make structural litigation more likely to
succeed. Steve Hanlon, an attorney who has been involved in a number of the
successful actions, notes that state constitutional law can play a significant role
in promoting the success of Sixth Amendment structural litigation in the more
than half of states that "have constitutional provisions which either provide
their supreme courts with original jurisdiction to 'superintend' the justice
system or permit the issuance of all writs necessary to the complete exercise of
their jurisdiction."47 Even without explicit constitutional authorization, state
courts can and do invoke their inherent authority to oversee the administration
of justice within the judicial system.** Other commentators have noted the
extralegal conditions that have promoted the success of structural litigation in
state courts, from strategic alliances, 4 9 to media and public support."o Though
it is common to hail a state's noteworthy litigation success as a "model" for
other states 5 the wide differences among jurisdictions along many
dimensions -including the nature and extent of their indigent defense
problems, their local politics, the insulation of their courts from political
pressures, and the availability of potential allies-mean that there can be no
one model for successful structural litigation. But the experience of the varied
jurisdictions that have achieved some substantial steps forward in this way
suggests that structural litigation has potential -perhaps even uniquely
45. See Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 427, 446-47 (2009).
46. See Hanlon, supra note 39, at 762-67.
47- Id. at 767.
48. Id.
49. See Drinan, supra note 45, at 457-58.
so. See Adele Bernhard, Take Courage: What the Courts Can Do To Improve the Delivery of
Criminal Defense Services, 63 U. PrrT. L. REV. 293, 331-32 (2002).
si. See, e.g., Drinan, supra note 45, at 445 (noting that the ACLU hailed its success in its
Connecticut litigation as a model for other states); Hanlon, supra note 39, at 762 (describing
Missouri's litigation as a model for other states).
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powerful potential-to generate the political will to promote indigent defense
reform.
State courts have additional powers, beyond their central authority to
decide cases, that can help to promote indigent defense reform. At the trial
court level, individual judges often are charged with directly approving or
denying requests for defense expenditures and thus control the local fiscal tap,
even if not the whole reservoir. Moreover, trial judges are the primary referees
on the adversary playing field and can play an important role in policing
attorney quality by referring inadequate lawyers (whether they be defense
counsel or prosecutors) for bar discipline. Trial judges can also reinforce
counsel's duties by directly advising defendants of their rights and by inquiring
into prosecutors' compliance with constitutionally mandated discovery. At the
more systemic level, state courts can use their rulemaking authority to
standardize best practices throughout the judicial system. Incremental judicial
measures such as these, though modest in the face of the immensity of the
issues facing indigent defense, have the advantage of being incremental -of
being within the power of individual judges or court systems and of not
requiring major resource infusions.
Also at the state level, and more removed from electoral politics than most
state courts, are state bar overseers and associations. These organizations could
do more to police attorney quality through bar discipline, especially in some of
the lowest-performing jurisdictions that produce the horror stories that are all
too easy to find. State bar associations can also be important allies for indigent
defense reformers not only in setting standards for attorney performance, but
also in promoting information gathering and ultimately in producing
legislation or facilitating litigation. For example, the success of indigent
defense reform in Missouri owes a large debt to the Missouri Bar, which
created a Bar Task Force on the Missouri Public Defender that persuaded state
senate leadership to hold hearings on the state's indigent defense crisis and
"arranged media tours around the state with the bar president."s2
The ABA lacks direct power over attorney licensing and discipline, but it
possesses a national voice and commands substantial resources. By generating
national standards for the conduct of attorneys in criminal cases, the ABA can
improve the quality of defense representation nationwide by promoting the
best practices that emerge from bird's-eye study of indigent defense systems
across the country. The ABA's potential power to promote change in defense
practice norms is illustrated by the Supreme Court's reliance, in a series of
landmark rulings on ineffective assistance of counsel in capital cases, on the
52. Hanlon, supra note 39, at 762-63.
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ABA's general Standards for Criminal Justice and the ABA's more specific
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases, first promulgated in 1989 and then revised in 2003. In three key
reversals of capital sentences between 2000 and 200S based on defense
counsel's inadequate investigation of mitigating evidence, the Supreme Court
cited ABA norms of performance for defense counsel, 3 leading both
commentators and lower courts to take a new and more demanding view of the
baseline requirements for capital defense lawyers.s4 Since the retirement of
Justice O'Connor in 2005, however, the Court has backtracked on its
endorsement of the ABA Guidelines as reflections of prevailing norms of
practice," rendering their ongoing influence more equivocal though by no
means erased.
Also in the death penalty context, one can see the power of the ABA's
resources to sponsor information gathering and dissemination as means of
promoting compliance with the best practices that it endorses. In 1997, the
ABA adopted a resolution calling for a moratorium on executions until
concerns about systemic problems and lack of fairness and reliability in the
nation's death penalty practices could be addressed.s' In 2001, the ABA created
the Death Penalty Moratorium Implementation Project to monitor and
promote progress toward a nationwide moratorium. In 2007, the Project
completed the first of a series of comprehensive assessments of the operation of
several states' capital punishment laws and processes, including their provision
of adequate defense counsel services. In each assessed state, the actual practices
of the jurisdiction were compared to the ABA's protocols on the administration
of the death penalty, and the jurisdictions were rated as "in compliance,"
"partially in compliance," or "not in compliance" with the ABA's protocols.57
The ABA's assessments naturally generated some pushback in the assessed
states. For example, Alabama Attorney General Troy King accused the ABA of
53. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387-88 n.6 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524
(2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000).
54. See John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neumann, "It's Like Deja Vu All Over Again": Williams v.
Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to the Guidelines
Approach to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 AM. J. CluM. L. 127 (2007).
ss. See Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13, 17 n.1 (2009).
s6. See Death Penalty Moratorium Implementation Project, About Us, A.B.A., http://www
.americanbar.org/groups/individual rights/projects/death-penalty-moratorium implement
ation-project/about us.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2013).
57. See Death Penalty Moratorium Implementation Project, Compliance with ABA Policies,
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bias against the death penalty in assembling an assessment team that had only
one prosecutor and no representative of crime victims." But the assessments
also created the opportunity for supportive political intervention by influential
voices. For example, former First Lady Rosalynn Carter issued a written
statement joining the call for a death penalty moratorium in Georgia,
specifically supporting the Georgia assessment team's report.s9 In addition to
evoking political support, the ABA's Death Penalty Implementation Project and
other similar endeavors have the capacity to provide important benchmarks
and practical suggestions for ongoing reform efforts.
The defense bar itself- the very entity in dire need of reform - can also be a
crucial source of standard setting and advocacy for reform. I saw this clearly in
my work for one of the nation's "flagship" public defender organizations. PDS
not only plays an important role in setting practice norms and providing
support for all indigent defense lawyers in the District, including the many
private lawyers who take court appointments to represent indigent defendants,
but it also serves as a national model of client-centered, zealous advocacy.
Moreover, NGOs that specialize in criminal defense work similarly serve the
indigent defense cause not only in the particular cases that they litigate, but
also in their own modeling of criminal defense practice norms. Stephen Bright,
a PDS alumnus, and Bryan Stephenson, along with some other exemplary
capital defense organizations around the country, have played at least as
influential a role as the ABA Guidelines in resetting the norms of practice for
capital defense lawyers. One can see the distance travelled from the 198os,
when the Supreme Court in Burger v. Kemp,6o in an opinion written by Justice
Stevens, upheld a capital sentence imposed despite the inexcusable absence of
any presentation of mitigating evidence, to the early 2000s, when Justice
Stevens joined a seven-member majority in Wiggins v. Smith6 , to reverse a
capital conviction on the grounds that the defendant's reasonably competent
and well-funded public defenders failed to fully investigate his social history. It
is impossible to make sense of these two holdings without recognizing the
profound transformation of the norms of capital defense produced by
exemplary specialized lawyers, both in government-funded offices and
privately funded NGOs. The ability to model exemplary defense services helps
58. See Phillip Rawls, ABA: Stop the Executions, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June ii, 2006,
http://sentencing.nj.gov/downloads/pdf/articles/2oo6/Jun2oo6/storyl4.pdf.
s. See Press Release, Carter Ctr., Former First Lady Rosalynn Carter on a Georgia
Death Penalty Moratorium, (Feb. 24, 2006), http://www.cartercenter.org/news/documents
/doc2305.html.
60. 483 U.S. 776 (1987).
61. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
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to generate the knowledge of what to change in less exemplary service settings.
Leaders in the indigent defense bar also play critical roles, therefore, in
lobbying for legislative change and helping to mount structural litigation to
promote reform.
The wide range of quality in the provision of indigent defense services
across the fifty states and even across counties within some individual states
suggests that the promulgation of statewide and national standards should be
accompanied by some public method of ranking or evaluation. As noted above,
the ABA's Death Penalty Moratorium Project provides a form of such
evaluation in its state assessment reports, which include extensive coverage of
indigent capital defense services. On a broader level, lawyer and reporter Amy
Bach has founded an NGO, Measures for Justice, to establish a "Justice Index"
that will rank criminal justice systems by county on the measures of public
safety, fairness and accuracy, and fiscal responsibility. Her hope is that such
rankings will engender competition, innovation, and ultimately collaboration
to embrace best practices.6 Bach's project parallels Professor Heather Gerken's
proposal for a "Democracy Index" to rank voting systems. As Gerken has
explained, in urging the efficacy of ranking as a means of spurring reluctant
reformers in the voting context: "if the goal is to improve the policy-making
process - to correct a failure in the political market- the only thing that beats a
good ranking is a better one."6 ,
Although the primary responsibility for creating and maintaining adequate
indigent defense systems lies with the states, the federal government could play
a much more substantial role than it currently does in fostering such systems.
Obviously, as the anniversary of Gideon reminds us, one important role is that
of the U.S. Supreme Court in elaborating federal constitutional norms.
Modulating the Strickland deficiency standard, as the Court has done to some
degree in the capital investigative context, or revisiting Cronic's almost
wholesale bar to demonstrating systemic prejudice, would boost the power of
both individual case review and structural litigation. Unfortunately, though,
neither development seems at all likely in the foreseeable future.
Also on any wish list for powerful but unlikely federal interventions would
be greater use of the federal funding and federal enforcement powers, or at
least the opening of the federal courts to nongovernmental efforts to protect
federal constitutional rights prospectively through structural litigation. As for
federal funding, although a major infusion of new federal funding to support
2708
62. See The Justice Index, MEASURES FOR JUST., http://measuresforjustice.org/know-more/the
-justice-index (last visited Apr. 14, 2013).
63. Heather K. Gerken, In Praise ofRankings, 19 WIDENER L.J. 1, 19 (2009).
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indigent criminal defense in the states would be a welcome balm to the many
jurisdictions afflicted by fiscal crises, the federal government currently faces its
own fiscal crisis, and, in any event, the primary responsibility for funding state
criminal justice systems will always lie with the states and their local units.
However, it is not so unrealistic to suggest that, of the substantial funding that
the federal government already provides to support state and local criminal
justice projects, a greater share should go to indigent defense. Estimates of
recent Justice Assistance Grants exceed a billion dollars, of which only a quarter
of one percent went to support public defense.1 Moreover, Congress has not
hesitated in other contexts to tie its spending to state compliance with
important federal standards (consider why all fifty states raised the drinking
age to twenty-one). Conditioning the disbursement of federal funds in the
criminal justice context upon state compliance with minimal standards for the
provision of indigent defense services would be another way that the federal
government could promote needed reform without substantial new infusions
of federal money.
As for federal enforcement, the Department of Justice has played a major
role in promoting state compliance with federal constitutional and statutory
civil rights guarantees. Similar federal enforcement actions could be a
potentially powerful force for breathing life into the Sixth Amendment
guarantees that are currently honored in name only in many jurisdictions
throughout the country. However, facilitating any such federal enforcement
would require enabling legislation6 s and some way around the Younger
abstention doctrine-either statutory abrogation of it as a merely prudential
rather than constitutionally mandated doctrine, or judicial interpretation that
creates an exception for actions for prospective or declaratory relief in the
criminal justice context. These changes to abstention doctrine alone would also
open up the federal courts as a forum for structural litigation by
nongovernmental actors. Because most state judges are elected, and indigent
defense reform is rarely popular, especially during times of fiscal crisis,
legislative or judicial assaults on Younger abstention are worth pursuing in
order to open up the more politically insulated federal courts to structural
66litigation.
64. See Jonathan A. Rapping, National Crisis, National Neglect: Realizing Justice Through
Transformative Change, 13 U. PA. J.L. & Soc. CHANGE 331, 355 (2009).
65. See Primus, supra note 33 (proposing federal legislation to enable federal enforcement).
66. See, e.g., Drinan, supra note 45, at 467-75; Rapping, supra note 64, at 332-34. See generally
Primus, supra note 33 (urging the importance of a federal forum for litigating systemic Sixth
Amendment claims and proposing legislation to create it).
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Even in the absence of these major changes, one can hope that President
Obama's creation of an Access to Justice Initiative within the Justice
Department in 2010, originally headed by my colleague Professor Larry Tribe,
will lead to a greater role of the federal government in leveraging its funding,
convening, reporting, and modeling powers to support reform of indigent
defense. Identifying best practices, funding model projects, convening and
convincing state actors, collaborating with national and state bar organizations,
and helping to support and direct the pro bono efforts of the private bar are all
roles that the Access to Justice Initiative can usefully play. To enable it do so,
however, the President needs to appoint a powerful new leader now that both
Tribe and his successor, Mark Childress, have departed.'
The private bar, too, has contributions to make to indigent defense reform.
Criminal defense provides excellent pro bono opportunities for private law
firms, because it rarely conflicts with the commercial work of most large law
firms, comes in relatively small projects, is popular with many young
associates, and provides otherwise rare courtroom experience. However,
throwing unprepared young associates into criminal court is good for neither
them nor the clients they serve. One model to be emulated is Arnold and
Porter's creation of the position of "trial training counsel," currently staffed by
Mary Kennedy, another exemplary PDS alumna, who guides the firm's
associates through criminal trials in the D.C. courts. 68 Another model is
Holland & Knight's Community Services Team, the largest full-time, private-
practice pro bono department in the nation, according to a profile of its
founder Stephen Hanlon,69 who did extraordinary work on structural Sixth
Amendment litigation from this perch. 7o
There is also exciting work being done by other social entrepreneurs in this
field. In particular, Gideon's Promise, formerly named the Southern Public
Defender Training Center, created by PDS alumnus Jonathan Rapping in 2007
with support from the Soros Foundation, uses a "Teach for America" model to
67. See Richard Zorza, What We Need Now at DOJ, RIcHARD ZORzA's AcCESS TO JUST. BLOG
(Nov. 28, 2012), http://accesstojustice.net/2ol2//28/what-we-need-now-at-doj.
68. See Mary C. Kennedy, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, http://www.arnoldporter.con/professionals
.cfm?action=view&id= 858&u= KennedyMaryC (last visited Apr. 14, 2013).
69. See Stephen F. Hanlon, GEORGETOWN LAW, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty
/hanlon-stephen-f.cfm (last visited Apr. 14, 2013).
7o. Hanlon announced in December 2012 that he was leaving Holland & Knight after twenty-
three years to teach a practicum at Georgetown on litigation challenges to indigent defense
systems. Marcia Coyle, Holland & Knight Partner Leaving Firm to Teach Indigent Defense
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infuse struggling public defense offices throughout the South with young
lawyers trained in PDS-style, client-centered, zealous advocacy. Gideon's
Promise aims to "inspire, mobilize and train" young public defenders with the
hope of raising the standard of indigent defense practice nationwide." The
organization offers continuing "graduate training" for its lawyers after they
complete their initial training and take on regular public defense positions, and
it also works closely with the chief public defenders from its partner offices,
holding an annual indigent defense leadership summit. This is an exciting
model for directing and supporting change in the places where it is most
needed.
Actors outside of the worlds of law and politics can nonetheless have
tremendous influence on those worlds, and the most powerful such actors are
in the media, as the enormous success of the book and movie Gideon's Trumpet
so well illustrates. Successful indigent defense reform has always been
accompanied by media attention that brings the urgency of the problems to
public attention. Learning to harness the power of the traditional media, as
well as the new, disaggregated power of social media, is central to creating the
political will necessary to move indigent defense reform forward. In this vein, I
note the premiere at the Sundance Film Festival this year of a film about
Gideon's Promise that follows closely several of its young attorneys, entitled-
aptly, in the anniversary year- Gideon's Army. The film will also air on HBO in
the summer of 2013, and it has been shown to student audiences already at
Harvard and Yale Law Schools, among others.
Which brings me, last but not least, to us. The legal academy has the
privilege and responsibility of initiating young lawyers into the norms of the
legal profession and educating them about the gaps between the system's ideals
and its realities. My students are always shocked and frankly a little
disbelieving when I explain some of the profound deficiencies of indigent
defense services in our criminal justice system-until they go to volunteer in
New Orleans or Montgomery or other jurisdictions where Gideon's promise is
profoundly neglected. We need to make the most of the opportunities we have
as educators to ensure that the next generation does a better job at working to
keep that promise.
Here, I salute The Yale Law Journal, which is part of both the media and the
legal academy, for lending its institutional prestige and influential platform to a
discussion of Gideon in this anniversary year. The importance of fifty owes
perhaps too much to the happenstance of the number of fingers on most
p. Goal & Mission, GIDEON's PROMISE, http://gideonspromise.org/about/goal-mission (last
visited Apr. 14, 2013).
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human hands, but it is not an opportunity that we should let go to waste. Just
as the turn of the new year inspires many of us to renew resolutions for
personal change, we should use these landmark case anniversaries to renew our
commitment to legal change - not merely through hortatory speeches, but
through my favorite device for personal change: list making. I hope that this
catalog of strategies for generating political will to promote indigent defense
reform will help advance both conversation and action so that we can begin to
retire some of our broken trumpet metaphors before the next big birthday.
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